

PREFACE

It was well known to all students of philosophy and history in Oxford, and to many others, that W. G. Pogson Smith had been for many years engaged in preparing for an exhaustive treatment of the place of Hobbes in the history of European thought, and that he had accumulated a great mass of materials towards this. These materials fill many notebooks, and are so carefully arranged and indexed that it is clear that with a few more months he would have been able to produce a work worthy of a very high place in philosophical literature. Unhappily the work that he could have done himself cannot be done by any one else unless he has given something like the same time and brings to the collection something like the same extensive and intimate knowledge of the philosophy of the period as Pogson Smith possessed. It is hoped indeed that, by the permission of his representatives, this great mass of material will be deposited in the Bodleian Library and made available for scholars, and that thus the task which he had undertaken may some time be carried out.

Among his papers has been found an essay which presents a very interesting and suggestive treatment

LEVIATHAN,
OR
The Matter, Forme, & Power
OF A
COMMON-WEALTH
ECCLESIASTICALL
AND
CIVILL.

By THOMAS HOBBS *of* Malmesbury.



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in St. *auls* Church-yard, 1651.

time : For when the voyces are equall, the not decreeing Execution, is a decree of Dilation.

Or if the number be odde, as three, or more, (men, *Negative* or assemblies ;) whereof every one has by a *Negative voyce*. Voice, authority to take away the effect of all the Affirmative Voices of the rest, This number is no Representative ; because by the diversity of Opinions, and Interests of men, it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest consequence, a mute Person, and unapt, as for many things else, so for the government of a Multitude, especially in time of Warre.

Of Authors there be two sorts. The first simply so called ; which I have before defined to be him, that owneth the Action of another simply. The second is he, that owneth an Action, or Covenant of another conditionally ; that is to say, he undertaketh to do it, if the other doth it not, at, or before a certain time. And these Authors conditionall, are generally called SURETYES, in Latine *Fidejussores*, and *Sponsores* ; and particularly for Debt, *Prædes* ; and for Appearance before a Judge, or Magistrate, *Vades*.

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OF COMMON-WEALTH.

CHAP. XVII.

*Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition of a
COMMON-WEALTH.*

The End of Common-wealth, particular Security. THE finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty, and Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which wee see them live in Common-wealths,) is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shewn) to the naturall Passions of men, when there is no visible Power to keep them in awe, and tye them by feare of punishment to the performance of their Covenants, and observation of those Lawes of Nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.

Which is not to be had from the Law of Nature. For the Lawes of Nature (as *Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy,* and (in summe) *doing to others, as wee would be done to,*) of themselves, without the terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like. And Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the Lawes of Nature, (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely,) if there be no Power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will, and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men. And in all places, where men have lived by small Families, to robbe and spoyle one another, has been a Trade, and so farre from being reputed against the Law of Nature, that the greater spoyles they gained, the greater was their

honour ; and men observed no other Lawes therein, but the Lawes of Honour ; that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives, and instruments of husbandry. And as small Families did then ; so now do Cities and Kingdomes which are but greater Families (for their own security) enlarge their Dominions, upon all pretences of danger, and fear of Invasion, or assistance that may be given to Invaders, endeavour as much as they can, to subdue, or weaken their neighbours, by open force, and secret arts, for want of other Caution, justly ; and are remembred for it in after ages with honour.

Nor is it the joyning together of a small number of men, that gives them this security ; because in small numbers, small additions on the one side or the other, make the advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient to carry the Victory ; and therefore gives encouragement to an Invasion. The Multitude sufficient to confide in for our Security, is not determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the Enemy we feare ; and is then sufficient, when the odds of the Enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment, to determine the event of warre, as to move him to attempt.

And be there never so great a Multitude ; yet if their actions be directed according to their particular judgements, and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a Common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application of their strength, they do not help, but hinder one another ; and reduce their strength by mutuall opposition to nothing : whereby they are easily, not onely subdued by a very few that agree together ; but also when there is no common enemy, they make warre upon each other, for their particular interests. For if we could suppose a great Multitude of men to consent in the observation of Justice, and other Lawes of Nature, without a common Power to keep them all in awe ; we might as well suppose all Man-kind to do the same ; and then there neither would be, nor need to be any Civill Government, or